Part I – Politics as a Cutthroat Game in Brazil
Note to the Reader – This trilogy develops an argument in three complementary parts. The first article argues that politics is inevitably a hard-nosed game and that a moralistic rejection of this logic merely transfers power to those who better understand institutional incentives. The second demonstrates that acknowledging political realism does not imply accepting the unlimited exploitation of constitutional rules, lest democracy be eroded. In the third, the focus shifts to the international arena, showing that countries under constant institutional strain reduce their external strategic capacity. The three texts are not contradictory: they form a logical sequence linking realism, limits, and projection.
Brazilian politics has been analyzed, all too often, through a moralizing lens that oversimplifies deeply complex processes. Institutional crises are commonly attributed to individual ethical lapses, power struggles are described as if they were pathologies, and distributive conflicts are portrayed as mere flaws in the democratic system. This approach, though rhetorically appealing, proves to be analytically poor. It ignores a fundamental tenet of political science: politics is, above all, an imperfect mechanism for resolving conflicts through the exercise of power.
Ever since Niccolò Machiavelli laid the foundations of modern political thought in *The Prince*, the realist tradition has recognized that governing means making choices under conditions of scarcity, conflict, and uncertainty. Political virtue does not consist in moral purity, but in the ability to preserve order and make effective decisions in adverse contexts. In the same vein, Max Weber, in distinguishing the ethics of conviction from the ethics of responsibility, warns that noble intentions do not absolve the political agent of the foreseeable consequences of their actions. Politics that refuses to operate on this level abdicates its organizing function and transfers the conflict to other arenas, often less transparent and more unstable.
This interpretive framework is consistent with the notion of “hardball politics,” as systematized by Christopher John Matthews. The concept does not describe immoral politics, but rather realistic politics, in which rational actors use the tools at their disposal—such as agenda-setting, the imposition of costs, and asymmetric negotiation—to maximize outcomes. Denying this logic does not eliminate it; it merely hands a strategic advantage to those who understand it better. In the Brazilian case, the refusal to accept politics as a strategic game has produced three interconnected phenomena: the weakening of the executive branch, the intensification of judicialization, and a clear asymmetry between the ideological camps.
Coalition Presidentialism and the Control of Time
Brazil’s coalition presidential system, characterized by Scott Mainwaring as a system marked by high levels of party fragmentation and multiple veto points, requires constant coordination between the executive and legislative branches. Electoral legitimacy alone is insufficient for governing; presidents fail not merely because of isolated mistakes, but due to chronic political isolation. Governments that confuse moral authority with leadership ability quickly lose control of the agenda and begin to operate defensively. The belief that it is possible to govern without conflict—or “above politics”—reveals a dangerous misunderstanding of the institutional design.
By relinquishing the legitimate use of instruments of power and negotiation, the Executive Branch transfers influence to the National Congress in a haphazard manner. When this transfer occurs without coordination, the result is not stability, but a paralysis of decision-making that brings the country to a standstill. Congress, for its part, deeply understands the logic of hardball politics. Legislative power lies in the refined control of the process: committees, reports, filibusters, and, above all, mastery of timing. Representatives and senators operate according to an incremental logic, controlling the political timeline in a way that the Executive Branch often cannot keep up with.
As Douglass North observes, institutions reduce uncertainty by creating predictable incentives; however, where this predictability fails, actors seek alternative routes to achieve their goals. The Brazilian legislature has internalized this logic. Public condemnation of this institutional practice does not neutralize it; on the contrary, it weakens the executive branch and legitimizes the informal transfer of power to parliamentary leaders without the same accountability to the electorate. Governments that refuse to negotiate strategically do not eliminate bargaining; they merely lose control over its terms.
Ideological Asymmetries and the Balance Between Ethics and Power
In analyzing the ideological landscape, the Brazilian left has demonstrated a greater capacity to adapt to a realist logic. First, it established narrative hegemony by linking its agendas to universalist values, thereby shaping the vocabulary of public debate—an element that Robert Dahl identifies as essential to pluralist competition. Second, it maintained a continuous institutional presence in various spheres of the state and civil society. Third, it practiced selective pragmatism in power, understanding that governing requires accepting reputational costs to preserve decision-making capacity.
The same cannot be said of the Brazilian right. Its fragmentation stems from fundamental strategic flaws: a reluctance to accept political compromise, the excessive personalization of leadership, and the absence of strong political parties. According to Robert Dahl, democracies depend on elites who accept temporary losses in exchange for permanent institutional gains. By substituting strategy for moral outrage, the right mobilizes the masses but fails when attempting to govern, as outrage creates momentary energy, while governability requires structure and patience.
In this political landscape, the so-called “Centrão” emerges as a rational response to the institutional framework: a mechanism of governance that stabilizes majorities and reduces decision-making uncertainty. Demonizing this bloc may yield immediate electoral gains, but it does not eliminate it from the process; on the contrary, it merely hinders understanding of it and any potential reform. Governments that have tried to ignore this reality have ended up governing against the system, reaping institutional paralysis and an accelerated erosion of their own authority.
The overall result is a Brazilian political landscape marked by an asymmetrically distributed “tough game.” While some actors understand the logic of power and operate within it, others attempt to replace it with a moralizing approach that merely shifts power to non-electoral arenas and weakens democratic accountability. Politics is not a contest of static virtues, but a contest for direction and results. Understanding it as a hard-nosed game does not imply abandoning ethical values, but rather defending them effectively within institutions.
After all, ethics without power is impotence, and power without limits is tyranny. Democratic maturity lies precisely in the balance between the two. Denying the game does not make it fairer; it merely ensures that the opponents, who understand it better, will play it far more successfully.
This article was originally published on Canal Comtexto. Check it out!
